In everyday life, we usually give our trust to a combination of something-we-have and something-we-know (e.g. The concept of Match-on-Card (MoC) consists of a smart banking cards, SIM card in mobile phones) but a password card which receives an applicant's candidate template T to be can be communicated or guessed and a personal device can be compared with the stored reference template Tref by processlost or borrowed. Building a three-factor authentication with ing the complete matching algorithm during a biometric au-the addition of one or several biometric techniques brings thentication request. The smart card will then output whether high confidence in our authenticated interlocutor and provides this comparison is positive or not. The main argument against non-repudiation. MoC-enabled smart cards is that it opens the way for YesCard (i.e. an attack path previously seen in Banking, a card always returning "yes"). The threat regarding Biometrics is not 2. AUTHENTICATION FACTORS only YesCard, but also NoCard as we will see in this paper. We will propose a protocol to easily thwart these attacks by 2.1 Smart Card using simple cryptographic primitives such as symmetric en-A conventional smart card is a silicon electronic chip embedcryption. This protocol will however only protect the system ded in a plastic rectangle printed with information concerning from malicious smart cards, but will not protect the smart card the application or the issuer, as well as readable information against malicious systems. Finally we will enhance this pro-about the card holder (for instance, a validity date or a photocol to protect the smart card against its use as a so-called tograph). This support can also carry a magnetic stripe or a oracle to guess the stored reference biometric template. bar-code.
INTRODUCTION
are mainly 8 or 16-bit ( Card) dreds of thousands of times. Java cards even allow the loading of executable programs (applets) into their nonvolatile mem-2.SoetiSomethingg P N od,a aswwe)mmmmknowmmmmmmmm(e.g.mmmmmmmmmammmPINmmmmmmmcode,mmmmmmmmammmmPassword)mmmmmmmmmmmmmmorymmmmmmaccordingmmmmmmmmmmmmmmtommmmmthemmmmmmcardmmmmmmmmholder'sorc c r d n g t teneeds.ers ees The smart card chip contains a communication port for 3.SoetiSomethingmeris,e.. iwerritaree,mmm(Biometrics,mmmmmmmmmmmmmme.g.mmmmmmFingerprint,mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmFace,mmmmmmmexchangingmmmmmmmmmmmmdatammmmmmandmmmmmmcontrolmmmmmmmmminformationmmmmmmmmm xcawithdtaantheolinoexternal heexera a contactless interface. The smart card chip is the ideal consamples, the algorithm will determine if the applicant is actainer for cryptographic secrets such as symmetric secret keys cepted or rejected. This statistical process leads to a False and asymmetric private keys. The use of contactless smart Acceptance Rate (FAR, i.e. the probability to accept a noncard chip is now mandatory in numbers of travel documents authorized user) and a False Rejection Rate (FRR, i.e. the [6] and national ID programs. Here, the role of the electronic probability to reject an authorized user . The process is like a biometric challenge-response: characteristics because of their poor resistance to user's stress the terminal reads the public part of the biometric inforor health troubles. The authentication process is a comparmation, process complex computation and send a canison between a pre-registered reference image, or template didate to the smart card to be compared with the pri-(representative data extracted from the raw image, built durvate part of the biometric information using very light ing an enrolment step) and a newly captured candidate image, computation on the smart card's chip. Processing and or template. Depending on the correlation between these two decision entities are clearly separated. entered candidate password is a wrong one then its hash value 3. Uncontrolled Area: user at home with the smart card is different and the authentication fails [13] . and biometric device (e.g. e-voting, e-commerce) This previous approach of security is impossible with biometric data. Any new capture of a biometric candidate results For instance, only the last context of use would permit a main slightly different data which leads to the statistical nature nipulation of the biometric reader to bypass the captured imof Biometrics-based authentication (distance evaluation beage and replay a matching candidate; idem for using a large tween two samples) [8] . The hash value of a reference bioman-in-the-middle device. metric template will be totaly different from the hash value Only the first context of use will prevent from the discrete of any matching candidate, this means that biometric referusage of a fingerprint copy or bad-looking smart card copy; ences have to be store locally, in clear text or maybe encrypted idem for using a discrete man-in-the-middle device. Classical but encryption is a reversible function unlike a hash function attack paths are:
which is a one-way function. For more information on encryption functions and hash functions see [14] . are public data. Something-we-have with something-we-know will miss real user authentication since there is no proof of Fig. 1 . Protocol #1 link between the user and his card/PIN code.
Three-factor authentication provides the highest security level in IT. Without being paranoid, some applications need and replay attacks by storing this reference template in a "safe". to duplicate one factor in the authentication scheme: someOnce written at the enrolment, the smart card will never outtimes we need to show both ID card and Passport, we need put this reference, only the candidate will be sent to the smart to present both face and fingerprints, we need to enter the card to be internally compared with the reference. However, password to log in a system and then enter another password since the smart card takes the decision, the MoC feature opens for the application we intend to use. For instance, the use the path for YesCard and NoCard. This widely used argument of smart card, PIN code, fingerprints and facial recognition against Match-on-Card can be easily thwarted by the protocol remains a three-factor authentication and not a four-factor audescribed hereafter. thentication as we can sometimes read in press releases and Firstly, we assume the use of a secure block cipher E (e.g. marketing messages.
AES, 3DES) and a cryptographic key k shared between genIn today's digital world, most of communication channels uine smart cards and the system. The first idea was to use are insecure since the first goal was to provide user conve-a challenge-response protocol to output the decision of the nience. When delivering a password or a biometric data, a smart card: a/ if positive verification of candidate template T, particular attention must be paid to this communication chan-the smart card send r = Ek (c) (the response) where c (the nel to avoid very simple way to bypass authentication in the challenge) is a random value given by the system together system. The use of cryptographic tools is mandatory to ensure with the candidate template T b/ if negative, the smart card the security of any three-factor authentication, the ultimate send any value different from r (c for instance). See Conversely, the NoCard is a smart card which has been This protocol obviously protects from a non-authorized maliciously modified to always answer with a negative au-smart card to be a Yes-or-No Card. thentication, whatever is the biometric data it receives. This provides denial of service for an authorized person to whom 5. THE ORACLE ISSUE an attacker has replaced the card and then get some benefits from this situation (afterward, the attacker could impersonate An oracle is a device or an algorithm to which we can submit the authorized user with a YesCard to enter in the system).
questions and get answers, the oracle model is a powerful tool The Match-On-Card feature has the unique advantage of to evaluate the security of a system by estimating the average protecting the reference template of the user against capture number of necessary queries to guess the content of the ora- 
